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EETU PIKKARAINEN 
FROM ONTOLOGY OF INTERACTION TO SEMIOTICS OF EDUCATION 
INTRODUCTION  
There seems to be some movement towards an ontological turn in the philosophy of education. The 
purpose of this chapter is to contribute this current debate by framing what the ontology for the 
philosophy of education could be and what it could offer. Some current writings in this movement will 
shortly reviewed and criticized because of too narrow and shallow understanding of ontology and 
missing ontological seriousness. Then the task of ontology will be concretized to the solving of some 
fundamental basic problems of philosophy of education. Solution to these problems will be sketched by 
introducing an alternative ontological theory developed originally by C. B Martin. This solution is 
closely connected to the theme of this book because it is essentially the ontology of interaction. Finally 
it will be noted that one cannot draw too straight practical conclusions from an ontological theory but 
in addition at least semiotic analysis of human interaction is needed. 
WHAT THE ONTOLOGY FOR PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION COULD BE? 
Ontology is a core area of theoretical philosophy. A common and useful delineation is to say that 
theoretical philosophy is divided to epistemology which studies our knowledge and metaphysics which 
studies the reality as such. And further, ontology is the most general area of metaphysics studying 
“being as being” or the most basic structure of the reality (Loux, 1998, 15). A concept of category is 
much used here and it refers usually to the most general classes into which the beings can be divided. 
These categories are typically such like objects or substances, properties, kinds or species, relations, 
events or processes etc. Ontological theories usually try to determine what categories there are and 
what the formal relations between categories are; is for example some category dependent of another 
(e.g. Loux, 1998; Lowe, 2001; Keinänen, 2008). 
 After empiricist (especially Hume’s) critics, Kant’s Copernican revolution and the rise of the analytic 
philosophy metaphysics lost its reputation for a while. Kant (1982, Preface to second edition) namely 
tried to show that although our knowledge about the reality is structured categorically those categories 
must reside only in the transcendental structure of our cognitive apparatus (transcendental apperception 
process); and we have neither right nor reason to claim anything about the structure of the reality as 
such-even though that reality is the source of our knowledge. In the last century metaphysics and 
ontology started to become a famous area of research again but at least in the beginning only in a 
Kantian (or neo-Kantian) mode as an analysis of the human ontological commitments. A leading figure 
was P. F. Strawson (1959) who called his approach descriptive metaphysics (description of the 
common and necessary way to think about reality) as differentiation from revisionary approaches 
which can only be either minuscule corrections to the descriptive theory or then perhaps beautiful but 
unbelievable buildings like the pre-Kantian rational ontologies of Descartes, Leibniz or Berkeley.  
 To the end of last century and going on in the beginning of this one there has been a noteworthy 
renaissance of serious, revisionary ontology as study of reality as such and independently of the 
structure of our cognitive apparatus (e.g. Armstrong, 1980). Now it became typical to redefine the 
descriptive vs. revisionary differentiation so that they both are situated to serious metaphysics of mind 
independent reality, but now descriptive is more devalued and restricted; and revisionary-typically 
going on from the problems found out by descriptive studies-tries to formulate new and better 
hypotheses about the basic structure of reality as such (Keinänen, 2008). Of course we have no 
possibility to evaluate these hypotheses empirically like scientific hypotheses, but instead by formal 
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criteria (comprehensiveness, methodicalness, conceptual economy and elegance) and perhaps indirectly 
by their helpfulness to solve theoretical problems unsolvable other ways (Martin & Heil, 1999, 49).  
 Thus we can figure out four possible approaches of ontology as cross tabulation of two dimensions. 
First there is the seriousness (reality as such) vs. non-seriousness (thoughts and commitments) 
dimension and secondly th descriptiveness (interpretative) vs. revisionism (inventive) dimension. The 
serious descriptive and revisionary alternatives are already described shortly above. The non-serious 
descriptive area could be perhaps thought as phenomenological analysis of ontological commitments. 
The last area of non-seriousness and revisionism is interesting and important especially for ontology in 
philosophy of education and I would call it tentatively as practical ontology, because it has a close 
connection to the question of practical philosophy and is perhaps even thought to be based on values. 
(See table 1.) Surely, the borderlines between these areas should not be stressed but rather their 




Thoughts about being Being as such  
Description Phenomenological commitment 
analysis 
Descriptive metaphysics / ontology 
Invention “Practical ontology” 
 
Revisionary metaphysics / ontology 
Table 1. Different approaches of ontology 
So what can these areas or approaches offer to philosophy of education? If we accept that philosophy 
of education is an essential part of the theory of education which should help us to understand what is 
education i.e. what are we doing in education; to study what is really going on in education; and yet to 
make decisions about the aims and tools of education then we can set at least next two important duties 
to ontological research and reflection. 
1) First if we want that our action and pursuits in education is rational at all then we should check 
that our ontological commitments are in coherence with our doings and plans. For example that 
we are not striving for aims which we think are impossible in this world. And we are not trying to 
affect objects or things that we really do not believe to exist. Contradictory suppositions even as 
unconscious can be compromising for the efficiency of our trials. 
2) On the other hand, the secured consistency between our ontological believes and our educational 
procedures may still be not enough. There is still a danger that we are doomed to misfire or to 
only haphazard success if our ontology does not hold in relation to the reality we are acting upon. 
If we believe that some goal is possible to gain and we strive for it with most rational tools, we 
will not yet gain it if it is impossible because of the structure of the reality.  
AN ONTOLOGICAL TURN IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION - ONTOLOGICAL 
WRITINGS IN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 
There can be found more than dozen writings addressing explicitly ontology or metaphysics-not 
discussion proper-during this century in the philosophy of education (in English). They all consider 
ontology extremely important to philosophy and also to practice of education, up to suggesting exactly 
the phrase “ontological turn” in their texts or even titles (Barnett, 2004; 2009; Dall'Alba & Barnacle, 
2007; Pio & Varkøy, 2012; Rømer, 2013). Common themes in these papers are: values and aims of 
education (Ibid, Bonnett, 2000; Brook, 2012; Kristjánsson, 2010), ontological commitments of 
educational research (Wegerif, 2008), and especially the concept of dialogue and its ontological 
bearings in education (Dall'Alba & Barnacle, 2007; Game & Metcalfe, 2008; Packer, 2000; Pio & 
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Varkøy, 2012; Wegerif, 2008). A very strong shared influence is from Heideggerian phenomenological 
and existential ontology of human existence, being-in-the-world (Dall'Alba & Barnacle, 2007; Pio & 
Varkøy, 2012). Of course the orientations and arguments differ much in these approaches but the space 
does not permit doing justice to them by more detailed analysis.  
 As a conclusion of previous survey could be said that the main concern the writers more or less all 
share is that of practical ontology. They all suggest some special way of thinking about reality and this 
thinking is not so much based on any serious ontological theory but rather on practical and value based 
views about the right or blessing objects and aims of education. At the same time they restrict them to 
quite special metaphysical questions of human beings and values. None of them tries either explicitly 
or strongly to build bridges to any general serious and revisionary ontology (except Rømer, 2013). So 
as a tentative critic to them
 
could be said that firstly they can do the previously mentioned first duty one 
of educational ontology i.e. coherence and rationality of action partly just because they restrict 
themselves to quite narrow questions. Secondly many of them do not even try to respond to the second 
duty to ask is the reality really such that our educational doings can affect it in hoped way.  
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS FOR THE ONTOLOGY OF EDUCATION 
Next I will list some of most burning problems of philosophy of education which seem to be 
particularly in the need of ontological analysis. These problems are strongly interconnected like all 
ontological questions are. They also all have a strong practical weight as they all are connected to the 
very old problematic of the concept of freedom and determinism as a counter side of it. I will call and 
differentiate the problems in this way: 
 
1) Freedom of action: Is there really that freedom of human action, which is required by our 
concept of responsibility? 
2) Openness of individual development: Are students beforehand predestined to some kind of 
career of learning; what are the limits of teaching? 
3) Openness of the future of society: Is the future determined and what restricts the possible 
changes?  
4) Interaction: How can we affect to other beings and events of the word; and be affected 
ourselves? 
 
We can start from a plausible assumption that all education in interaction. If we think of teaching as a 
special case of education then we could say that in the interaction between teacher and student the 
teacher is trying to affect the student so that the latter would change in certain way which we call 
learning. How is this possible and what there happens? How this happening is based on the general 
basic structure of the world? Responsibility of action is one central goal for many devoted teachers 
especially in so called moral education. The concept of responsibility does not only contain a wish that 
the action would be good, but rather that the actor herself did freely or autonomously (or at least 
compos mentis) choose to act in a way she acted. But does our science bound ontology allow this kind 
of freedom if every event in the world is caused and at least in principle is possible to explain by some 
other previous events (see e.g. Shabo, 2011)? If this freedom does not exist then such traditional ideas 
of pedagogy—referenced often by a German term Bildung, (Siljander, Kivelä, & Sutinen, 2012)—like 
the open possibilities for a human being to master and transcend any cultural contents and for a society 
and human kind to cultivate still better and more just unforeseen social and cultural structures are only 
vain hopes and pious words.  
 The sound ontology for the philosophy of education should answer all these questions above as 
accurately as possible. The answer or answers should be such that they are not just ad hoc or custom-
build for educational needs but they must be based on the general ontology of the whole reality. As 
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such these answers cannot of course be any detailed and readymade solutions to the specific problems 
on educational theory and practice but rather like general reflector planes against which then coherence 
and credibility of special solutions could be observed and by way of which the educational views could 
be compared and connected to other areas on action and knowledge. 
PROBLEMS OF UNIVERSALS AND DUALISM IN OUR RECEIVED ONTOLOGY 
The trap of dualism 
It has been very popular to start or restrict the study of ontology or metaphysics to the debates between 
such doctrines like idealism, materialism and dualism. The bitter controversy between materialistic and 
idealistic views has a long and well known history in western philosophy. The doctrine of dualism is 
usually connected to the theory of Descartes about human being (1968, 156). Dualism as a combination 
of materialism and idealism is though much older. What are these all about? There seems to be in the 
world something that is describable as material: concrete, extending, spatial, hard or soft, more or less 
inert stuff. On the other hand there seems or at least feels to be something different: our thoughts and 
ideas, values, feelings etc. These both are hard to deny but at the same time surprisingly hard to put in a 
same coherent picture of the world.  
 Today dualism gains much criticism in the philosophy of education especially from the semiotic 
theory (Stables, 2010). There are many reasons to that criticism. First one is of course that reciprocal 
interaction should be possible between the “material” and the “ideal”. Minds should get knowledge and 
stimuli from material objects and mind’s plans and intentions should act back to them. In addition 
dualism seems to be a bad habit of thought: if we separate ideal and material, then we may probably 
also separate hither and transcendent, rational and irrational, human and animal, culture and nature, 
adult and child etc. etc. And we do not only separate them but also put them in mutually exclusive 
spheres of reality and thus no interactions and transitions between them seem to be possible.  
 But can we step away from dualism? I claim that taking a side between materialism and idealism will 
not do at least any more. You cannot deny the other side and you will always bounce back to some kind 
of dualism. But fortunately we are not locked in this trap forever in ontology. Namely “material” and 
“ideal” are just special cases of so called universals, perhaps the most universal of them. Next lets’ see 
if we could throw all the universals overboard! 
Problem of universals  
In ontology it is usually assumed that there exist at least individual objects or particular things, shortly 
particulars. You and I; this table; that pencil etc. are particulars. Those particulars which exist more or 
less independently are traditionally called substances. In addition to these particulars there may be 
something else too. Those particulars seem or feel to be similar and different is some respects. These 
respects can be called generally properties: particulars can have color, shape, size etc. For example this 
pencil is sharp and yellow. It seems that there exist also properties like yellowness and sharpness. 
Substances and properties are two candidates to the categories of ontological theories. There can be 
also others but traditionally ontologists have tried to restrict the amount of categories to the necessary 
minimum according to the central methodological rule called ontological parsimony, or Ockham’s 
razor, or qualitative economy.  
 Now, how is it explained that some particulars are similar? They can be similar in two ways: Yellow 
pencil and yellow note paper are similar because of their color, so according to one property. Yellow 
pencil and red pencil are similar because they are both pencils, so according to their species or kinds. 
Those ontologists who think that the yellow pencil and the yellow paper somehow share a common i.e. 
universal property of yellowness suppose that in addition to particulars there exists a special category 
of universal properties. Yellowness can be one of the members of this category. This stance to believe 
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in the existence of universals is traditionally called realism though universalism could be a better name 
(Simons, 1994). 
 As well known, the most extreme example of realism was Plato. For him, the universals—thought as 
eternal and stable ideas-were the most independent, pure and strongly existing of all beings. All the 
empirical particulars were derivative, unimportant, bundles of imperfect mirrorings of ideas. The ideas 
were hierarchically structured so that highest ideas were goodness, beauty, just etc. So this theory was 
practical, it gave values which empirical beings could try to strive or imitate in their imperfect manners. 
Aristotle did not accept that ideas could exist independently but instead they were always connected to 
particular substances. He also transferred the interest from individual properties to species as some kind 
of bundles of properties. For him again species were stable and eternal—no Darwin yet in sight. And 
also for him ontology had practical bearing: the species has an essence i.e. a whole of the essential 
properties of that species. The “duty” of particular members of the species is to mimic or realize the 
essence of the species as well as possible. My pencil is sharp and so it is a good pencil if sharpness 
belongs to the essence of the species of pencils. (See e.g. Armstrong, 1980 for classification of the 
main alternatives in relation to universals.) 
 As we can easily see from this not so impartial description, the realism at least in these core forms is 
quite questionable starting point for educational ontology. It would easily lead to determinism, 
pigeonholing of students, nothing new under the sun view, non-interactionist categorizing and dualism. 
But this is not the main point. It is also a guzzling ontology with its excessive categories of universals. 
Fortunately there is also an alternative to realism and it is traditionally called nominalism. An extreme 
form of nominalism states that only particulars exist. Not even properties in particulars do exist. 
Particulars although form resemblance classes and we can give those classes arbitrary names like 
yellow or pencil. Another, more interesting and fruitful form of nominalism thinks that properties are 
something real and existing, but they are not universal. Instead every yellow particular has its own 
yellowness, and not a shared common and universal yellowness. These property particulars are called 
tropes (Bacon, 2008; Keinänen, 2005; Simons, 1994).  
C. B. MARTIN’S ONTOLOGY AS AN ALTERNATIVE 
Now I have tried to convince on the one hand that the realistic (or universalistic) ontology is defective 
both as a practical and revisionary ontology and on the other hand that there are real alternatives for it. 
Next I will describe some central features of the ontological theory which I at the moment think is the 
best candidate for sound ontology for philosophy of education. Unfortunately this theory does not have 
a proper name of its own, so I will call it after its original developer as C. B. Martin’s ontology (Martin, 
1980; 1997; 2002; 2008; Martin & Heil, 1998; 1999; Heil, 2003; 2010; Snowdon, 2008). This theory 
can be classified as trope theory, but it does not belong to trope bundle theories which state that 
ordinary particular objects are only bundles of tropes and nothing else (Martin, 1980; Simons, 1994). In 
bundle theories the properties are somehow independent beings which just happen to gather together to 
form an object. Instead Martin sees properties rather as particularized ways of being of objects. Every 
property, i.e. trope, must be a property of some object, part of that object’s way of being.  
 One central feature of Martin’s view is what is called compositionality. It means quite simply that all 
objects can be thought as wholes structured (or composed) from smaller objects. Objects are what they 
are because of the ways of being of those smaller or simpler objects as its parts and the structure or 
composition that those parts form. Larger wholes can be more complex and have more complex 
properties than the simpler parts, but they are always strictly in the same ontological level. So there are 
no separate levels of being and thus no need for complicated and problematic concept of emergence. 
Simple and complex beings of course have different properties but so do usually have also objects 
which are as complex or as simple. No ontological categories are needed to account these differences 
and they can be thought fully gradual. (Martin & Heil, 1999; Martin, 2008, 35-40.)  
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 Another and definitely the most important feature of this theory is Martin’s view of properties as at 
the same time dispositional and qualitative. Dispositions have been usually thought as some special 
kind of properties that will manifest only in certain situations like the fragility of the glass. That 
fragility is manifested only when something breaks the glass. On the contrary such property like 
transparency of the glass has been thought to be quite different kind of property which is manifest all 
the time. These latter kinds of properties have been called qualities or categorical or occurrent 
properties. There are many views about the nature of these two types of properties and the relations 
between them. According to Martin they are not two types of properties but every property has a 
dispositional side and qualitative side. For example the transparency is a disposition to let light go 
through when lighted just like fragility is a disposition to break when hit and non-fragility is a 
disposition to stay unbroken even when hit. (Martin, 1997; Martin, 2002.) So any object can only 
manifest such qualities for which it has dispositions, but on the other hand we can know about the 
dispositions of an object only after they have been manifested as qualities. 
 Strictly connected to the conception of properties is the Martin’s view of causality. An ordinary 
example of causal event is such that some property of one object affects some other object so that some 
property of the latter changes. But according to Martin every manifestation of the disposition as a 
quality is causal event and every causal event is an interaction. For example on the one hand a grain of 
salt has a disposition of solubility to water and on the other hand water has a disposition to solve salt. 
Now when we put that grain of salt to glass of water these dispositions manifest in both objects so that 
salt becomes solute and water becomes salty. So causality takes place between objects not between 
events. The manifestation requires something to trigger it. In simplified case we can think of two 
disposition partners like those of salt and water which reciprocally trigger the respective dispositions in 
each other. In reality the interactions can of course be more complicated so that the whole environment 
of an object effects to the manifestations of its dispositions. (Martin & Heil, 1998.)  
 Especially useful feature of Martin’s theory is its applicability to the philosophy of mind (Heil, 2013, 
chapter 6). Plainly put there is clear parallel between simple causal events and human experience. 
Latter one is of course compositionally more complex but ontologically also these are on the same 
level. When you see a yellow pencil, it as a disposition partner triggers in you a manifestation of your 
disposition to see a yellow pencil. That manifested quality of seeing a yellow pencil in you does not of 
course need be qualitatively similar to a yellow pencil-at least as little as these words of “yellow 
pencil” are qualitatively similar to a yellow pencil. All causal interactions are in principle similar to 
mental representation: The causal effect of a disposition partner A takes place in a disposition partner B 
in a manner which is strongly dependent on the dispositions of B itself. 
 The point above has some remarkable consequences. In principle any causal interaction cannot be 
told apart from information change and also every causal effect contains a kind of (instantaneous) 
“interpretation” from the point of view of the dispositions of the object of the effect. So force is not the 
best general metaphor for causal interaction. Physical events of causation and human experience are 
ontologically on the same level but of course compositionally perhaps as far from each other as can be. 
So this view does not mean reductionism: physics cannot explain problems of psychology or education 
without changing itself to psychology or science of education. Neither does this mean materialism 
(because nominalist cannot be materialist) nor panpsychism (Martin & Pfeifer, 1986). But now we 
know that there is no special mystery in the mental existence of humans-in addition to the normal 
mystery of the existence of the whole reality. 
CONCLUSIONS: POSSIBILITY OF EDUCATION AS ONTOLOGICALLY UNDERSTOOD 
Education is semiotic interaction but how in earth is it possible to be so? Are the four practical 
problems solvable in the light of our new ontology? We have seen that every being with its dispositions 
is capable of being and doing more than it ever is and does. In addition beings can change. They can 
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grow bigger and gain more and more complex and miraculous properties. Human beings are perhaps 
the most complex beings with infinite possibilities to change their ways of being. What is possible for 
the society depends just upon us-and other beings. We can never know is some aim impossible before 
we try to achieve it and after that there is still endless amount of other chances to try in another way. 
Yes and we can teach each other and turn in to dialogue. Perhaps it is even easier to do that than cease 
from it, if we just remember that all learning takes place in action and all action is interaction. 
 But the hardest philosophical problem is still the freedom of action as precondition of responsibility 
and as an ultimate goal of education. Is freedom really possible? I cannot of course give here any final 
answer but perhaps some speculations may be done. First we must remember that no being is fully 
determined by its environment or by previous events, but it responds to its environment from the base 
of its own dispositions. Human beings with their mental representations are still less dependent of their 
environments because they can create i.e. remember and imagine such environment effects which do 
not exist at the moment or at all. But after all is it possible for a being to cause events itself so that it is 
not determined by the previous events? This is perhaps not so important question as it has been seen 
because causality is not in the relations between events. Event is a derivative being based on causal 
interaction between substances. One interaction changes the situation and after it other interactions are 
possible. So succession of events do not determine happening but rather makes it possible.  
 The possibility of freedom is based on the possibility of a being to spontaneously change or remain 
unchanged. This is a plausible possibility (Martin & Heil, 1999, fn 4). Of course this spontaneity is not 
the same thing as freedom of human action as an ultimate goal of education, but the previous is a 
precondition to the possibility of the latter. The latter can be thought as an ability to take part in the 
creation of new rules of action, based more or less on the old rules, and to try to obey them. These rules 
are connected to the structures of societies and contents of cultures and they are under continuous 
reconstruction as new problems and new solutions to them appear and are produced. This semiotic 
process—Bildung, if you pardon—could be, if anything, the ontologically based essence of education.  
 But I should still stress that from this general ontological background we cannot draw any or at least 
much practical conclusions. All principles and knowledge about methods, contents and aims of 
education require special historical, phenomenological, hermeneutical research—and especially 
semiotical analysis (Pikkarainen, 2010; Semetsky, 2010; Stables, 2005) 
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